THE care and custody of the mentally ill has customarily been considered a state and local rather than a federal function. Certainly the major burden of performing this task of public assistance and police protection is carried by local government agencies, to the extent that it does not still rest on the shoulders of families and relatives. It is also customarily believed that the mentally ill or defective offender is infrequently encountered in federal law enforcement. For there have been fewer homicide trials in federal courts than in state courts, and it is in such cases that the defense of insanity is most often raised. Homicide apart, a conception of federal crime as typified by larger scale depredations and more complex schemes than the delinquencies popularly associated with mental cases has also been rather widespread and misleading.1 Although these two notions regarding the incidence of mental cases in the federal penal process once had a factual basis, they are increasingly invalid, both because of the progressive expansion of federal criminal legislation and the fact that we have only recently begun to learn to recognize mental illness readily.
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The purpose of this article is to reappraise the problem of the mentally ill offender against federal law, i.e., to examine the problem of the offender against accepted social interests, whose personality deviates, from a psychiatric viewpoint, from the norm or norms attributed to the group treated as "criminal". It is proposed also to evaluate the existing federal statutory provisions, together with current procedures and administrative arrangements for this class of offenders.2
The term "offender" is used advisedly to denote a larger category than "criminal". For when an offender's personality deviation is recognized as of a certain degree and quality, it is one of the tenets of our law that he may not, consonant with due process, be brought to trial or sentenced; if such was the state of his personality at the time of the offense, it is also 1944] FEDERAL TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL well established that he is not to be regarded or treated as a criminal. But in each instance the offender may still be regarded and treated as a police problem; in each situation, there is legal authorization for his removal from the community and commitment to a custodial institution. The distinction is thus one both of assumed moral status and of administrative jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, however, the present federal criminal procedure and administrative practice fail to screen out many offenders who, in light of contemporary psychiatric theory, belong in the category of the mentally ill or defective. As a result many persons are subjected to criminal proceedings in violation of the constitutional requirement of due process. To some of them the trial is an ordeal as devastating as it is unnecessary. To the government the result is an inappropriate and even socially harmful expenditure of prosecution resources. When such anr individual is convicted and sentenced the result is even less excusable. The problem is one for treatment, but of a quite different kind from that which the Bureau of Prisons is equipped to give. And the conviction destroys, without justification, such reputation as the individual may have possessed.
Of course, some of the mentally ill are spotted before conviction. The criminal proceeding is then suspended if not dropped altogether; but the offender may still be a public menace. Here the existing provisions for an alternative federal disposition are inadequate. Or the illness may be detected after a prisoner enters upon the service of a sentence of imprisonment. It may then appear that the prisoner was probably mentally ill at the time of trial, and even at the time of the commission of the offense; or the illness may appear to have developed or reached an aggravated stage only after he began serving his sentence. In either,of these situations the prisoner can be transferred by an administrative order to an institution for the care and custody of the mentally ill; the federal government maintains several institutions for this purpose. But in the first situation, the injustice involved in the conviction and commitment of the offender as a criminal stands uncorrected; in both the provision for federal care and custody is inadequate in that it does not extend beyond the maximum period of the criminal sentence, however mentally ill and dangerous the prisoner may then be.
MENTAL ILLNESS OR DEFECT AS A BAR To PROSECUTION
The Standard and its Application. Under current practice, the issue of the offender's sanity may be raised in the first instance in order to ascertain whether he is presently triable. For, at Anglo-American common law, mental illness of the accused or the presence of a defect amounting to "insanity" bar further proceedings in a criminal case. Under our Constitution, this conditioning of the validity of a criminal proceeding upon the sanity of the accused is considered a requirement of due process.3 Accordingly, the legislation dealing with the disposition of persons charged with offenses against the United States and found to be insane implicity assumes that such persons are not to be prosecuted so long as they remain mentally ill.
The considerations of policy underlying this view are historically complex and in part forgotten, as is the case with so many of the institutions of this most ancient branch of law. Those which commend themselves today are expressed in the current formulation of the standard for ascertaining whether offenders are mentally capable of undergoing trial.
To date, Congress has left formulation of this standard to the courts. The terms "sanity" and "insanity" are now merely legal concepts. Though there was a time when they were also considered medical concepts, it is observable today that these legal criteria trouble the conscientious expert witness, since they do not correspond with modern psychiatric conceptions and classifications. Criteria such as those advanced in McNaghten's case 4-the so-called "right and wrong" test-employ alleged psychological concepts, which actually fail to jibe with the expert's clinical experience, and have hence been of little help to him. These legal terms must, therefore, be regarded as no more than short-hand expressions of a policy with respect to the kinds of offenders who shall be dealt with by one set of governmental correctional processes, i.e., the "criminal", and the kinds who shall be dealt with by another and quite distinct set, i.e., the "insane". 5
It follows that sanity for purposes of present triability need not necessarily mean the same thing as sanity in the sense of criminal responsibility for an act; in fact, the courts have recognized this distinction.6 The standard of present triability which appears to have met with approval in the federal courts is that formulated by Judge Jones in his instruction to the jury in the Chisholm case.7 The issue is whether the accused has "sufficient mental power, and has such understanding of his situation, such coherency of ideas, control of his mental faculties and the requisite power of memory, as will enable him to testify in his own behalf, if he so desires, and otherwise to properly and intelligently aid his counsel in making a rational defense." Application of this standard requires court and administrative procedures that fulfill two functions. First, offenders exhibiting symptoms which 1944] FEDERAL TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL suggest any serious question as to triability should be screened out for subjection to the legal test. Second, sufficient technical and background information must be made available to the judge so that the issue of triability may be intelligently determined. Hence, the question arises as to the adequacy with which current federal procedures accomplish these objectives.
Under current practice, the question of the offender's triability may be raised at any stage in a criminal proceeding. Where it is raised before trial, the accused is entitled at least to a preliminary inquiry by the court, which may, however, be ex parte; mere inspection by the court may suffice. The court's duty at this stage is only to entertain the motion and determine whether the question is raised in good faith and upon plausible grounds; the record should show that such duty has been exercised.8
Since no specific procedures for determining finally the issue of triability are prescribed by statute, the courts have looked for guidance to the common law. Several methods are thought to be authorized: (1) commitment of the accused to an institution for observation and report; (2) appointment of a commission to examine and report; and (3) the holding of a formal judicial hearing.9 Whatever method is followed, there can be no valid final determination of the issue without notice and opportunity for the accused to present evidence and be heard.'0 Whether this final determination shall be made before trial or reserved for trial rests in the discretion of the judge."1
Where the method employed is that of a formal hearing, the accused's evidence is heard first, and he has the burden, according to the more recent decisions, of overcoming the ordinary presumption of sanity by creating a reasonable doubt.l2 The hearing may be held with or without the assistance of a special jury, in the discretion of the court, as in the proceeding on the common law writ de lunatico inquirendo.l3 There appears to be no particularly settled practice throughout the United States, with respect to the use of a jury. Sometimes the inquiry is on motion of the accused; in any event it is comtnon practice to obtain his consent.16 But presumably the court may inquire into this issue of its own motion and order a psychiatric examination or commit the accused for observation even though he has been admitted to bail.17 Some question has arisen as to the privilege against selfincrimination, with respect to statements which may be elicited from the accused in the course of such an examination.18 No federal adjudication on this point has been found; however, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted with this problem in the Esposito case 19 in 1942. Pursuant to pleas of present insanity, the trial court had committed the accused for observation before trial. During the commitment, metrasol and sodium amytal (inhibition-relieving drugs or "truth serums") had been administered, in connection with the psychiatric interrogation to determine whether the accused were malingerers or were actually insane. Appealing from an adverse determination, the accused contended that this constituted a violation of their privileges against self-incrimination. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that in so far as the inquiry was into the issue of sanity, there had been no violation. It is believed that the federal courts should adopt a similar view.
It thus appears that where the issue of an offender's triability is raised before the trial, the federal courts have ample power to.inquire into his sanity. There should be no great difficulty from a budgetary point of view, since funds have been appropriated from time to time from which the fees of psychiatrists appointed by the courts may be paid. 
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However, where the issue of mental illness or defect as of the time of trial is raised for the first time at a later stage, as for example after verdict or finding of guilt or even after sentence, the situation is less clear. In a proper case, relief should presumably be available on motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, subject, of course, to the standing time limits on these motions. However, there was some suggestion in the Lee case in the Fifth Circuit, that a motion in arrest of judgment on this ground is addressed merely to the discretion of the court.2
Where resort to these motions is barred by limitations, there is common law precedent for relief through the writ of error coram nobis;21 it is not settled, however, whether the federal courts will exercise a similar jurisdiction.22 The remaining possibility is habeas corpus. On the theory that an accused whose mental capacities fall below the standard formulated in the Chisholm case is incompetent to plead, and to assist counsel or waive counsel, it is probable, in the light of recent decisions of the Supreme Court, that such relief is now available.23 This was suggested in the recent Forthoffer case in the Ninth Circuit, but not decided, as the court felt that, in any event, the petitioner had failed to show that he was sub-standard mentally at the time of entering his plea, or that his waiver of counsel was not competent.4
The chief deficiency of current processes for determining nontriability and for screening out offenders is that, in many districts, the administrative patterns are such that the initiative in raising the question of mental illness before trial is left pretty much to the defendant. For in most instances the mentally ill defendant does not consider himself incapacitated; moreover, like other federal defendants, he is frequently represented by assigned counsel, if any. The result is that the initiative is too infrequently exercised. During a six month period in 1943, for example, it was the experience of the Bureau of Prisons that over 100 seriously mentally ill or very feeble-minded persons were convicted and sentenced. The condition may well be on the increase, since the expansion of federal criminal law is bringing numerous new categories of offenders into federal custody.
How, then, is a greater awareness of the symptoms of mental illness and defect to be stimulated among those who come into official and professional contact with accused persons before trial? Of course, this is basically a problem in the education of such persons-the commissioners, the marshalls, the prosecuting and defense attorneys, the probation officers, and the judges. Not that they need be or should be psychiatrists. What is required is sufficient training to enable them to know when and how to utilize the assistance of psychiatrists.
In addition to such long range education, one possible remedy might be to build on the provision for pre-sentence investigations and reports contained in the present Probation Act.25 The Act does not now prescribe the time when the investigation shall be made; in some districts, indeed, it is felt that a probation officer should not interview the defendant until after the verdict or finding of guilt. The scope of the investigation is similarly not prescribed; nor is it required that the investigations be made unless the court so directs. Hence the practice varies from district to district. It has been estimated that investigations are now made in about half of all cases, but they generally do not include psychiatric examination.
Another method for insuring the early detection of mental illness would be devisal of an administrative arrangement for the routine medical examination of all federal prisoners held in county jails or other places of detention, pending indictment or trial. Local physicians would be available for this purpose, and, assuming the utilization only of those having some familiarity with psychiatry, even a cursory examination should serve to uncover a great many of the cases of mental illness.
The In some of these instances, commitment may be justified on the theory that the insane person belongs to a group, in whose care and protection the federal government has a special interest. As the court said with reference to the commitment of a retired naval officer in the Treibly case:31 "His care and protection, while thus incapacitated and unable to act for himself, are the concern and duty of the government." Much the same line of reasoning was employed in the Barry case,32 involving a merchant seaman. The principle is akin to the parens patriae concept usually invoked as a basis for the state commitment of delinquent and neglected juveniles. But the guardianship or special obligation relationship is not the only recognized basis for the commitment of an individual in our law. In federal practice, an innocent material witness may also be committed to insure his presence at a criminal trial.33 An accused person lawfully arrested may be committed in federal as in state criminal proceedings where it appears necessary to insure his presence at the trial assuming that he does not furnish bail or that the crime charged is one where release on bail is not required. Jurors may be ordered confined during all recesses for the duration of a criminal proceeding to insure their freedom from pressure and influence. In the De Marcos case 34 the court upheld federal commitment of an American citizen, who had been found insane in Canada but who on transfer to the United States was found to have no ascertainable legal residence in any state, territory, or in the District of Columbia. In all these instances, the legal principles invoked emphasize the welfare and protection of the public, rather than of the individual committed. The common denominator underlying these varied situations is that the federal government is employing commitment as an instrument for the protec- In the case of the person who is taken into custody on a federal charge and is found before trial to be insane, both bases of federal jurisdiction appear to be present. Such a person is lawfully in federal custody by reason of his arrest and therefore entitled to reasonable care so long as that custody continues; he is likewise entitled to a fair and timely trial, which however is impossible so long as the insanity continues. It would therefore appear to be the government's duty to provide for his care and treatment so that he may be restored to sanity as soon as possible. There is, of course, the alternative of release, but this is barred because the government has established probable cause for his detention on the criminal charge.
To release a putative offender may mean escape; it may also mean commission of further federal offenses, which will be no less dangerous because the offender is legally irresponsible. Assuming a showing that the accused is insane and not fit to be at large, there is therefore at least as substantial a basis for federal commitment as in the case of a mere material witness.
Apart The remaining legislative gap is with reference to persons charged with federal offenses who have either not been taken into custody or who have been released on bail. The policy basis for this gap is unclear. It may rest on the assumption that dangerously insane persons will usually be without funds and without friends with funds, and hence unlikely to make bail. Or it may be thought that as a practical matter, the United States Attorney can usually arrange matters by having bail set at a high figure, or otherwise, so that a really dangerous individual will be in actual custody and hence subject to the commitment provisions of the Act. Or it may simply be that there has been a desire to limit federal commitment of the insane, and that this limitation just happens to be the one hit upon. The known legislative history leaves the explanation a matter of conjecture.
What has been the practice ? In many cases the federal charge has been dismissed when a prisoner has been found insane. In some of these cases, the prisoner has then been committed by a state court or voluntarily ad- for from one to four years. In summary, it appears that in every case where commitment seems necessary the appropriate officials work it out as best they can, not infrequently being handicapped by the obscurities and omissions in the enabling legislation.
MENTAL ILLNESS OR DEFECT AS A DEFENSE
The issue of the offender's sanity may also be raised at trial as a defense to the federal charge. Relatively few recorded federal criminal cases have gone to trial which involved an insanity defense and there is no legislation governing either the standard or procedure. Consequently, whenever the issue has arisen, the courts have looked to the common law. The insanity defense is, of course, recognized, and it may be raised either by special plea or under the general issue ;88 the burden is on the claimant defendant to overcome the presumption of sanity by evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.89
The Standard. Contemporary formulations of the standard of insanity as a defense vary in phraseology, taking as a point of departure the rule laid down a century ago in England in McNaghten's case. 40 The following representative formulation is from an opinion handed down in 1941 in the Southern District of California: "To excuse an act because of insanity the degree of insanity must be shown to have been sufficiently great to have controlled the will power of the defendant at the time the act was committed. When reason ceases to have dominion over the mind, proven to be diseased and the person reaches a degree of insanity where criminal responsibility ceases, accountability to the law for the purpose of punishment no longer exists. The issue upon that point is, was the defendant's brain impaired to such an extent that he was incapable of forming a criminal intent, and that his mind was not under his control by reason of this infirmity, and his brain was compelled to it, that at the time his will power, judgment, reflectiot, and control of his mental faculties were impaired, so that at the time he could not distinguish between right and wrong, or that the act was done under pressure of an irresistible, and uncontrollable impulse at the time. A substantially similar charge was approved by the Supreme Court in 1902 in the Hotema case,42 involving a member of the Choctaw Indian tribe. Since an alleged belief on the part of the defendant that the victim of his homicide was a witch was an element in the case, the charge also dealt specifically with the subject of delusions. It was stated that in order to excuse the accused's conduct, a belief such as that attributed to the defendant must be "the product of a diseased brain" and his act "the result of such diseased brain." Disposition. If the interposition of a defense of insanity in a federal court is followed by acquittal of the accused, there is no statutory provision for further detention or commitment. Sections 211 and 212 of Title 24 hardly seem applicable, as one who has been acquitted is no longer considered charged with an offense, nor is he supposed to be in custody. The statement in a contemporary treatise on federal criminal procedure that "If a defendant is acquitted on the ground of insanity, commitment to an institution generally follows, for observation and detention until cured" must therefore be taken to refer to action by cooperative state authorities.43
Here, again, our legislation is inadequate. Where state commitment is both available and reliable, it may well be the most appropriate way of disposing of a troublesome mental case; but when one who has committed a federal offense is thus disposed of, the federal government loses control of the situation. An inmate who is a real hazard may be released in a relatively short time from some state institutions; for many of these mental hospitals are over-crowded, and some are unduly susceptible to local influences. There is, moreover, the problem, already noted, of the person without a determinable legal residence. Suppose the case of another Guiteau, with paranoid designs on the President of the United States. If such a person were acquitted as insane after one assassination attempt, should not the federal government be authorized to commit him to an appropriate federal institution, in the event that state commitment proved for one reason or another not feasible?
MENTAL ILLNESS DISCOVERED OR OCCURRING AFTER CONVICTION AND COMMITMENT
Prisoners are often found to be insane after entering upon the service of their sentences, at the outset and later. It may appear that the insanity probably antedated the conviction, or that it developed after receipt of the offender by the Bureau of Prisons. Moreover, in some cases sanity may be restored prior to the expiration of the sentence, and in others it may not be. These various situations raise a series of separate problems. The Bureau of Prisons. It was said in the Youtsey case44 that "It is fundamental that an insane person can neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected to a trial, or, after trial receive judgment, or, after judgment, undergo punishment." The reference in the last clause is, of course, to the common law rule that if one under sentence of death becomes insane after conviction, execution is to be deferred until sanity is restored.45 (Perhaps, as the court which issued this dictumt and some commentators have assumed, this common law rule could be successfuly invoked in capital cases in the federal courts; no case has actually been found in which the situation has arisen.)
Convicts sentenced to terms of imprisonment and found, on receipt by the Bureau, to be mentally ill or defective are by no means uncommon. More often than not it will appear that such mental illness or defect probably existed at the time of arraignment or trial, and it may likewise appear that it probably existed at the time of the commission of the offense. What is to be done in this situation?
As already explained, the government or counsel for the prisoner could move for a new trial within the time allowed for such motions, or attempt to avail themselves of certain other possible remedies. But prisoners are usually without counsel at this stage, and there is no established administrative policy favoring the re-opening of such cases. Existing legislation providing for the transfer of prisoners who are or become insane from penal institutions to mental hospitals fails to distinguish between prisoners of the kind now under discussion and those who develop serious mental illness after entering upon the service of their sentences. This failure to differentiate between these dissimilar categories of prisoners constitutes another defect in our federal scheme, for it obviously does violence to considerations of due process and elementary justice. Commitment of persons who are mentally ill or have serious defects in any case appears unwise. Our federal penal institutions are not primarily designed or equipped for the care and treatment of the mentally ill. To sentence one of these offenders when his illness or defect is determinable in advance is not only unfortunate for the individual, but also a positive nuisance to the prison authorities. An administrative practice designed to return such convicts to the courts for more appropriate disposition would make prosecuting attorneys and judges more alert to the problem and go far to convince them of the desirability of avoiding criminal jurisdiction in such cases. Certain changes in the existing statutes and practices have been recommended in the course of this article. These should be effectuated through comprehensive revision of the relevant provisions of Titles 18 and 24, rather than through rules of court or the process of judicial decision in particular cases; for the indicated changes involve alterations in penal administration as well as judicial procedure. Amendments of the existing statutes are necessary to establish jurisdiction in certain situations, to clarify policy, and to prescribe procedures. Furthermore, new or additional appropriations will be needed to effectuate certain of the suggested reforms.
Disposition of Convicts Found
The point, of course, is not that the federal government should compete with the states in the care and treatment of the mentally ill and defective. Nor should the federal government encourage the states to dump as federal charges individuals who should b.e cared for in local mental hospitals. The statutory authorizations for federal commitment should in all instances be permissive rather than mandatory; and administrative practice should be alert to discourage the pressing of federal criminal charges, where the impetus comes primarily from local officials desirous of ridding themselves of a local public assistance problem.
